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Abstract
Many real-world conflicts are to some extent determined randomly
by noise. The way in which noise is modeled in contest success func-
tions (CSFs) has has important implications both for the possibility
of forming cooperative relationships as well as for the features of such
relationships. In a one-shot conflict, we find that when noise is mod-
eled as an exponential parameter in the CSF, there is a range of values
for which an alliance between two parties can be beneficial, whereas
that is not the case for an additive noise parameter. In an infinitely
repeated conflict setting with additive noise, sustaining collusion via
Nash reversion strategies is easier the more noise there is and more
difficult the larger the contest’s prize value, while an increase in the
contest’s number of players can make sustaining collusion either more
or less difficult, all in marked contrast to the case of an exponential
noise parameter. Which noise specification is appropriate is therefore
an important consideration for modeling any conflict situation.
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1 Introduction
Conflict situations are often modeled as contests, in which players compete
by making irrecoverable expenditures or costly efforts to increase their prob-
ability of winning a prize.1 In many cases, however, players’ winning proba-
bilities are determined not only by their expenditures, but also by additional
factors of chance or noise. For example, a military conflict could be decided
not only by the sizes of the countries’ armies, but also by the geography and
prevailing weather where the conflict takes place.
Another prominent aspect of conflicts is cooperation among competing
parties, and whether or not such agreements are worthwhile or sustainable.
Throughout history some warring factions have been able to ally with one
another against rivals while others have fought on their own, all with varying
degrees of success. In other circumstances, parties have managed to sustain
collusive agreements of peace for extended periods. In this paper we con-
sider the impact of incorporating noise into a contest model as one of the
many factors that may influence whether or not conflicting parties can ally,
cooperate, or collude.
The usual (one-shot) contest model features a finite set of players I =
{1, ..., n}, n ≥ 2, with each player i ∈ I spending an irrecoverable amount
xi in an effort to win a conflict. Each player’s probability of victory is de-
termined by a contest success function (CSF), pi(x1, . . . , xn). If all players
assign a value of v to the prize awarded to the winner of the contest, each
player i ∈ I then simultaneously maximizes
pii(x1, . . . , xn) = pi(x1, . . . , xn)v − xi.
1Other applications of contest models include political lobbying, electoral competition,
litigation, advertising competition, R&D competition, and sporting competition.
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The most popular CSF is the Tullock (1980) CSF, which takes the form
pi(x1, ..., xn) :=

xγi
xγi +
∑
j 6=i x
γ
j
if xγi +
∑
j 6=i x
γ
j 6= 0
1
n
otherwise.
(1)
The exponent 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 measures the CSF’s sensitivity to expenditures
in determining winning probabilities.2 It is commonly referred to in contest
theory literature as the CSF’s discriminatory power following Hillman and
Riley (1989), but can also be thought of as a noise parameter. For low levels
of γ (i.e., high levels of noise), winning probabilities do not vary much among
players with small expenditure differences; in the limit as γ → 0, the CSF
is completely insensitive to expenditures and each player has a uniform 1/n
probability of winning no matter their expenditure choice. For high levels of
γ (i.e., low levels of noise), winning probabilities vary widely among players
with small expenditure differences; in the limit as γ →∞, the CSF becomes
the all-pay auction CSF in which the player making the highest expenditures
wins with probability 1.
An alternative CSF similar to the Tullock form but with an additive
(rather than exponential) noise parameter was put forth by Amegashie (2006b).
This CSF posits player i’s probability of victory as
pi(x1, ..., xn) :=
xi + α
xi + α +
∑
j 6=i(xj + α)
, (2)
where α > 0 is the noise parameter.3 For the remainder of the paper, we will
often refer to (2) simply as the additive noise CSF.
The two CSFs are similar, and each has desirable properties. The Tullock
CSF’s popularity in the literature stems from a variety of features, including
2The restriction on γ is sufficient to ensure an interior pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
3Dasgupta and Nti (1998) also use a similar CSF specification in their study of optimal
contest design, but interpret their parameterization as the probability that the contest
does not award the prize, which is more like the contests with the possibility of a draw
studied by Blavatskyy (2010) and Jia (2012).
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its intuitive economic interpretation and the axiomatic properties provided
by Skaperdas (1996). A stochastic foundation for its functional form is also
provided by Jia (2008). The additive noise CSF preserves many, though not
all (homogeneity of degree zero, for example), of the Tullock CSF’s properties
while, as Amegashie (2006b) notes, improving tractability in some cases. Rai
and Sarin (2009) provide an axiomatic foundation and Jia (2012) provides a
stochastic foundation for CSFs of the form in (2).
While the two CSFs are different in terms of what they allow a researcher
to focus on, most importantly yielding solutions in terms of different param-
eters, the one-shot equilibria they admit are not all that different from one
another qualitatively, especially when players are symmetric. When compar-
ing the two models in the presence of opportunities for alliance formation
or collusive arrangements, however, we find that they lead to very different
results. In particular, in a one-shot conflict, a sufficient degree of exponen-
tial noise can make an alliance between two parties profitable relative to
a non-cooperative state, while no such alliance exists under additive noise.
This is due to the fact that only exponential noise allows the allies’ expendi-
tures to be sufficiently imperfectly substitutable in the allied CSF, mitigating
free-riding incentives.
Perhaps more surprising is the difference between the two models when
players attempt to sustain collusion in an infinitely repeated conflict. With
the additive noise CSF, we show that an increase in the contest’s degree
of noise makes sustaining collusion easier, an increase in the contest’s prize
value makes sustaining collusion more difficult, and an increase in the con-
test’s number of players can make sustaining collusion either more or less
difficult. These results stand in rather stark contrast to the existing results
on sustaining collusion with the Tullock CSF by Shaffer and Shogren (2008),
who show that the prize value has no effect on collusion, while more noise
and more players both make sustaining collusion more difficult.
The reason for these differences is the type of deviation made by defecting
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players in each case. With exponential noise a player can deviate from a col-
lusive state of zero expenditure to win the prize with probability 1 with only
an arbitrarily small amount of spending. With additive noise the optimal de-
viation is more complicated, since noise still to some extent determines the
contest’s outcome, even if all other players’ spending levels are zero. This is
also the reason why an increased number of players does not always make
collusion more difficult, as it does in most other models.
In the following section, we consider a one-shot conflict with the possi-
bility of alliance formation and how noise affects whether or not alliances
are profitable for the allies themselves. We then develop a model of repeated
conflict with noise, derive novel results on sustaining collusion via Nash rever-
sion strategies with the additive noise CSF, and then compare those results
to existing results on collusion in repeated conflicts with the Tullock CSF. A
final section concludes the paper.
2 Alliance Formation in One-Shot Conflicts
with Noise
What is the impact of noise on the prospect of alliance formation or collusive
arrangements in conflict situations? We begin by considering a one-shot
contest in which parties choose their expenditures simultaneously once and
for all. In such a setting, some parties may choose to ally with one another,
combining forces to take on another rival. For simplicity and for ease of
comparison with other work in the alliance puzzle literature, in this section
we confine our analysis to a three-party conflict, though it could be expanded
to n parties.
Konrad (2009) and Ke et al. (2013) consider a three-party conflict in
which two parties are predesignated to ally with one another. Those two
parties can be interpreted as perhaps compatible in some military or cultural
way, while the third is not. Assuming parties 1 and 2 are the allies, the
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advantage to being in the alliance is that the allies’ probabilities of victory
are modified as
p1 = p2 =
x1 + x2
x1 + x2 + x3
.
The third party’s CSF is the standard Tullock CSF with γ = 1.
A downside to being in an alliance is that, in the event of a victory, the
prize must be shared in some way. Ke, Konrad, and Morath (2013) consider
two possibilities: that the prize may be shared equally between between the
two parties, perhaps due to some prearranged binding contract, or fought
over in a second-stage contest among the allies. We will primarily focus on
the former case, so the value to winning the contest for each ally is simply v
2
rather than v, but will address results with the latter as well.
Regardless of which of the two sharing rules is used, taking first order
conditions and solving for equilibrium expenditures and payoffs leads to what
is known as the alliance puzzle. First, because the allied parties have identical
first order conditions, only the sum of the alliance members’ expenditures,
and thus the sum of their expected payoffs are uniquely determined, not
their individual values. Second, the combined allies’ expenditures are less
than the expenditure of either party on their own in the standard, unallied
case, which leads the allies to have at best a combined payoff equal to that
they would achieve if they were unallied.4 Specifically, for the case of equal
prize division among allies:
(i.) (x∗1 + x
∗
2) =
v
9
while x3 =
2v
9
,
(ii.) p∗1 = p
∗
2 =
1
3
while p∗3 =
2
3
,
(iii.) and (pi∗1 + pi
∗
2) =
2v
9
while pi3 =
4v
9
.5
At best, the allies will end up with the same payoff they would have if
they had not allied, and one may end up worse off. This is due in large
4In a standard contest with a Tullock CSF as in (1) with all parties maximizing their
payoffs individually, x∗i =
γ(n−1)
n2 v and pi
∗
i =
n−γ(n−1)
n2 v for all i ∈ I.
5Splitting the prize via second-stage intra-alliance conflict only harms the allies relative
to the unallied party, as the additional conflict further dissipates the prize value for the
allies.
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part to the free-riding effects caused by the perfect substitutability of allies’
expenditures in the CSF, but also to the weakened expenditure incentives
caused by splitting the prize.
With sufficient noise in the CSF, the alliance puzzle disappears. Note,
however, that the noise must be of the exponential rather than the additive
variety. Otherwise, if the allies’ CSFs were modified to include noise as
p1 = p2 =
x1 + x2 + 2α
x1 + x2 + x3 + 3α
.
with a complementary unallied p3, the same results for the alliance paradox
would persist. The allies’ expenditures would remain perfectly substitutable
in the CSF, so the free-riding effects would remain.
Suppose instead of being perfectly substitutable, the allies expenditures
combine in the CSF as
p1 = p2 =
xγ1 + x
γ
2
xγ1 + x
γ
2 + x
γ
3
(3)
with 0 < γ < 1, and p3 the complementary probability. With equal prize
division, the following first order conditions obtain:
∂pi
∂x1
=
xγ−11 x
γ
3
(xγ1 + x
γ
2 + x
γ
3)
2
v
2
− 1 = 0,
∂pi
∂x2
=
xγ−12 x
γ
3
(xγ1 + x
γ
2 + x
γ
3)
2
v
2
− 1 = 0,
and
∂pi
∂x3
=
xγ−13 (x
γ
1 + x
γ
2)
(xγ1 + x
γ
2 + x
γ
3)
2
v
2
− 1 = 0.
With three unique first order conditions, as opposed to only two in the per-
fectly substitutable case, it is possible to solve for unique expenditures and
expected payoffs for all three parties. Along with the probabilities of victory,
they are:
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(i∗.) x∗1 = x
∗
2 =
22γ−1γv
(4γ+2)2
and x∗3 =
22γ+1γv
(4γ+2)2
,
(ii∗.) p1 = p2 = 11+22γ−1 and p3 =
22γ−1
1+22γ−1
(iii∗.) pi1 = pi2 =
(2+22γ−γ22γ−1)
(2+22γ)2
v and pi3 = (
22γ
2+22γ
− 22γ+1γ
(22γ+2)2
)v.
Remark. The allies’ collective action problem is more evident in x∗1 and x
∗
2
in (i∗)., as ∂x∗1/∂γ < 0 and ∂x
∗
2/∂γ < 0. The more sensitive the CSF is to
the parties’ efforts (i.e., the less noise there is), the worse is the incentive to
free ride. More noise actually dampens the incentive to free ride, since ally
expenditures become less substitutable.
The main result of this section comes from simply comparing the allies’
payoffs in (iii∗.) with what they would achieve if all three parties simply
maximized their payoffs individually with the CSF in (1). Both are decreas-
ing in γ, or increasing in noise, because noise reduces equilibrium conflict
expenditures. The allies’ payoffs increase more quickly as noise increases
(γ decreases) when they collude, however, since it alleviates their collective
action problem while preserving some benefits of the allied CSF. There is
therefore a threshold level of noise past which the allies are both unambigu-
ously better off working together. Comparing payoffs and solving then leads
to the following.
Proposition 1. For three-party contests with 0 < 0.245 < γ, parties who
ally with a CSF as in (3) and divide their prize equally are unambiguously
better off together than competing individually in a standard Tullock contest.
Sufficient noise in a conflict situation therefore makes alliances worthwhile
when otherwise parties are better off fending for themselves. Again, however,
this is only for the exponential noise specification, not the additive noise
version.
Two additional features of alliance formation in conflicts with noise de-
serve mention. First, the alliance puzzle feature that remains is that the
unallied party is made better off when two parties ally against it for any
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0 < γ ≤ 1, another result of the allies’ reduced expenditures. For this reason,
a corollary to the previous proposition is that sufficient noise, 0 < γ < 0.245,
makes it Pareto-improving for alliances to form in conflict situations when
allies divide the prize equally. Second, if the allied parties do not share the
prize in the event of victory, and instead divide it via a second-stage conflict,
then alliances are never worthwhile for any 0 < γ ≤ 1 as the prize value is
too badly dissipated.
3 Tacit Collusion in Repeated Conflicts with
Noise
Many real-world contests are also repeated. Repeated contests could provide
players opportunities and incentives to collude by mutually refraining from
competing with one another. If players are sufficiently patient (or, equiv-
alently, believe the contest will repeat with a sufficiently high probability),
then long-term collusion could dominate short-term opportunism when play-
ers use strategies with implicit threats to punish deviations from collusion.
Continuing with the military conflict example, the long-lived nature of inter-
actions among countries could provide them incentives to alter their military
expenditures or reach other agreements that have them refrain from engag-
ing in costly conflicts. Because there are many repeated contests with noise,
gaining insight into how noise affects incentives for collusion in repeated con-
tests is important.
Accordingly, we now analyze incentives for tacit collusion in an infinitely
repeated contest with noise. We focus our analysis on the CSF with additive
noise introduced by Amegashie (2006b), since Shaffer and Shogren (2008)
have already performed a similar analysis for the Tullock CSF.6 Though our
6Other existing studies of contests with noise in the CSF are either one-shot (e.g.,
Cason et al. (2013), Wasser (2013), and Grossmann (2014)) or are repeated but do not
analyze players’ incentives for collusion (e.g., Eggert et al. (2011)).
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results on collusion in repeated conflicts with the additive noise CSF are of
independent interest, comparison with the results from Shaffer and Shogren
(2008) makes clear that the features of collusion in repeated conflicts strongly
depend upon how noise enters the CSF.
If players are sufficiently patient, they can sustain maximal collusion (i.e.,
mutual refraining from conflict) by using Nash reversion strategies with ei-
ther of the CSFs under consideration. With additive noise, we show that
an increase in the contest’s degree of noise makes sustaining collusion eas-
ier, while an increase in the contest’s prize value makes sustaining collusion
more difficult. The latter result is reminiscent of the well-known resource
curse in which countries dependent upon wealth from natural resources like
minerals and petroleum are more prone to violent conflict; for a review of
the extensive resource curse literature, see Ross (2015). An increase in the
contest’s number of players can make sustaining collusion either more or less
difficult. This last result for the additive noise CSF is perhaps the most
interesting, since it means more parties being involved in a conflict does not
always make collusion more difficult, contrary to most other economic models
of competition.
In addition to its implications for conflict, this section contributes to a
more general literature on collusion in repeated contests. The main message
of this literature is that the long-lived nature of repeated contests can provide
players incentives to collude, which typically leads to lowered contest expen-
ditures. Yang (1993) and Leininger and Yang (1994) analyze contests in
which players take turns choosing whether to increase or leave unchanged
their current expenditures, which accumulate over the contest’s horizon;
when these alternating moves occur over an infinite horizon, a tit-for-tat-like
strategy can enable players to keep their equilibrium expenditures low and
possibly even minimal. Linster (1994) analyzes cooperative arrangements
determined by the Nash bargaining solution when players’ disagreement pay-
offs arise from reversion to Nash equilibrium play in an infinitely repeated
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contest. Amegashie (2006a) shows that increased prize value asymmetry
between players makes sustaining collusion easier in an infinitely repeated
contest. In an infinitely repeated game of investment with imperfect prop-
erty rights, Amegashie (2011) shows that an equilibrium with overinvestment
exists where the asset owner and the potential appropriator cooperate by not
competing for the asset in a subsequent contest as long as the asset owner
makes a transfer increasing in investment. Cheikbossian (2012) studies in-
finitely repeated contests between two groups of unequal size and shows that
collusion (in the sense of a group overcoming its free-rider problem and in-
creasing its expenditures) can be as easy to sustain in the larger group as it
is in the smaller group.7
3.1 The Repeated Conflict Model with Additive Noise
CSF
Each period t = 0, 1, 2, ..., the n players compete in a simultaneous-move
contest to win a prize of value v > 0 to each player. The stage games are the
same as the one-shot contests described above, with each player i ∈ I making
irrecoverable expenditures xit ≥ 0 to increase their winning probability pit,
given by the additive noise CSF with parameter α from Amegashie (2006b):
pit(x1t, ..., xnt) :=
xit + α
xit + α +
∑
j 6=i(xjt + α)
. (4)
As in the case of exponential noise, increasing the degree of noise in this
CSF also has the effect of discouraging expenditures. Thus, we assume that
α ∈ [0, α) where α := (n − 1)v/n2 so that the stage game’s unique Nash
equilibrium is interior; if instead α ≥ α, the stage game’s unique Nash equi-
7There also exist a number of studies that analyze explicit collusion in one-shot contests
(e.g., Alexeev and Leitzel (1991, 1996) and Huck et al. (2002)) and that develop models of
infinitely repeated contests to analyze non-collusive behavior (e.g., Itaya and Sano (2003),
Mehlum and Moene (2006), Kra¨hmer (2007), Eggert et al. (2011), and Grossmann et al.
(2011)).
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librium has each player making an expenditure of 0 and there exists no form
of collusion yielding players a Pareto improvement thus making the analysis
of incentives for collusion moot.
When players make expenditures (x1t, ..., xnt) in period t, the expected
profits of player i ∈ I in period t are:
piit(x1t, ..., xnt) := pit(x1t, ..., xnt)v − xit
=
xit + α
xit + α +
∑
j 6=i(xjt + α)
v − xit. (5)
Each player discounts streams of future profits to their present value accord-
ing to the discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
3.2 Results on Collusion
In the absence of collusion, we suppose that players make expenditures ac-
cording to the stage game’s Nash equilibrium. As Amegashie (2006b) shows,
when α < (n − 1)v/n2 the stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium in
which each player makes expenditures
xN =
n− 1
n2
v − α
and earns expected profits
piN =
v
n2
+ α
each period.8
When α < (n− 1)v/n2, players can improve upon the stage game’s Nash
8It is straightforward to show that the first derivative of (5) with respect to xit is
positive when xjt = 0 for all j ∈ I \{i} and α < (n−1)v/n2, ruling out all players making
0 expenditures as a Nash equilibrium. It is also straightforward to show that (5) is strictly
concave in xit.
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equilibrium by collusion where each player makes an expenditure of
xC = 0
and earns expected profits
piC =
v
n
each period. We suppose that players use the following Nash reversion strate-
gies of Friedman (1971) to sustain collusion tacitly as a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of the infinitely repeated contest.9 Nash reversion strategies pre-
scribe that each player i ∈ I
• makes an expenditure of xC = 0 in period t = 0;
• makes an expenditure of xC = 0 in periods t = 1, 2, ... as long as
all players have made expenditures of xC = 0 in all periods to date;
otherwise, the player makes an expenditure of xN = (n − 1)v/n2 − α
forever.
As an alternative to Nash reversion strategies, we could analyze collusive
behavior sustainable by the optimal punishment approach of Abreu (1986,
1988). Adopting such an approach would be preferable if Nash reversion
strategies did not sustain maximal collusion because optimal punishments
can support a wider range of collusive behavior in equilibrium. However, as
we show below, since Nash reversion strategies do sustain maximal collusion,
we opt to follow the Friedman (1971) approach.
The optimal deviation xD of a player i ∈ I from the collusive arrangement
above solves
max
xit
piit(xit, 0, ..., 0) =
xit + α
xit + nα
v − xit. (6)
9Numerous studies of collusion in repeated contests follow a similar approach; see,
for example, Linster (1994), Amegashie (2006a, 2011), Shaffer and Shogren (2008), and
Cheikbossian (2012). Therefore, we adopt this approach so that our results on incentives
for collusion are comparable to ones already existing in the literature.
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The first-order condition of (6) is
(n− 1)α
(xit + nα)2
v − 1 = 0, 10
which is satisfied by
x˜D = ±
√
(n− 1)αv − nα,
of which only x˜D =
√
(n− 1)αv−nα > 0 when α < (n− 1)v/n2. Therefore,
the optimal deviation is
xD =
√
(n− 1)αv − nα
and earns expected profits of
piD = v − 2
√
(n− 1)αv + nα.
Nash reversion strategies sustain collusion as a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of the infinitely repeated contest if and only if the discounted
profits from collusion exceed the discounted profits from deviation and re-
version to the stage game’s Nash equilibrium forever; that is, Nash reversion
strategies sustain collusion if and only if
∞∑
t=0
δtpiC ≥ piD +
∞∑
t=1
δtpiN ,
which simplifies to
piC
1− δ ≥ piD +
δ
1− δpiN ,
10It is straightforward to show that (6) is strictly concave in xit.
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or, in terms of a critical discount factor δ∗,
δ ≥ piD − piC
piD − piN
=
v − 2√(n− 1)αv + nα− v
n
v − 2√(n− 1)αv + nα− ( v
n2
+ α
) := δ∗. (7)
Note that δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) because piD > piC holds if and only if [(n−1)v/n−nα]2 >
0, which always holds, and piC > piN holds if and only if α < (n − 1)v/n2,
which holds by assumption. Any factor increasing δ∗ makes collusion more
difficult to sustain and any factor decreasing δ∗ makes collusion easier to
sustain. The following proposition describes how δ∗ varies with α, v, and n.
Proposition 2. When players attempt to sustain maximal collusion by us-
ing Nash reversion strategies in an infinitely repeated contest with the contest
success function in (4), (i) an increase in the contest’s degree of noise makes
sustaining collusion easier, (ii) an increase in the contest’s prize value makes
sustaining collusion more difficult, and (iii) an increase in the contest’s num-
ber of players can make sustaining collusion either more or less difficult.
Proof. (i) Differentiating (7) with respect to α, we have
∂δ∗
∂α
=
− (n−1)v√
(n−1)αv + n
v − 2√(n− 1)αv + nα− ( v
n2
+ α
)
−
[
v − 2√(n− 1)αv + nα− v
n
] [
− (n−1)v√
(n−1)αv + n− 1
]
[
v − 2√(n− 1)αv + nα− ( v
n2
+ α
)]2
= −
√
(n− 1)αv
{
(n− 1)v − n
[
2
√
(n− 1)αv − nα
]}
α
[
v − 2√(n− 1)αv + nα− ( v
n2
+ α
)]2 < 0,
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which holds if and only if
(n− 1)v − n
[
2
√
(n− 1)αv − nα
]
> 0,
which holds if and only if
[
(n− 1)v − n2α]2 > 0,
which always holds.
(ii) Differentiating (7) with respect to v, we have
∂δ∗
∂v
=
1− (n−1)α√
(n−1)αv −
1
n
v − 2√(n− 1)αv + nα− ( v
n2
+ α
)
−
[
v − 2√(n− 1)αv + nα− v
n
] [
1− (n−1)α√
(n−1)αv −
1
n2
]
[
v − 2√(n− 1)αv + nα− ( v
n2
+ α
)]2
=
√
(n− 1)αv
{
(n− 1)v − n
[
2
√
(n− 1)αv − nα
]}
v
[
v − 2√(n− 1)αv + nα− ( v
n2
+ α
)]2 > 0,
which holds if and only if
(n− 1)v − n
[
2
√
(n− 1)αv − nα
]
> 0,
which always holds, as we have shown above in (i).
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Figure 1: Critical Discount Factor Sustaining Collusion (α = 0.9, v = 100,
n ∈ [2, 100])
(iii) Differentiating (7) with respect to n, we have
∂δ∗
∂n
=
− αv√
(n−1)αv + α +
v
n2
v − 2√(n− 1)αv + nα− ( v
n2
+ α
)
−
[
v − 2√(n− 1)αv + nα− v
n
] [
− αv√
(n−1)αv + α +
2v
n3
]
[
v − 2√(n− 1)αv + nα− ( v
n2
+ α
)]2 ≷ 0.
Figure 1 illustrates the nonmonotonic relationship between n and δ∗ by
graphing (4) for α = 0.9, v = 100, and n ∈ [2, 100]. Figure 1 shows that an
increase in n initially makes collusion more difficult to sustain and eventually
makes collusion easier to sustain.
The properties of δ∗ are fairly intuitive. An increase in α decreases piD,
decreasing incentives to deviate from collusion, while it increases piN , increas-
ing deviation incentives because of the less severe Nash reversion punishment;
the former effect dominates, thus an increase in α makes sustaining collusion
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easier. An increase in v has three effects on δ∗: it increases piD and piN ,
both of which decrease incentives to deviate from collusion, and it increases
piC , increasing incentives for collusion; the first two effects dominate, thus an
increase in v makes sustaining collusion more difficult. An increase in n also
has three effects on δ∗: it decreases piD and piN , both of which decrease in-
centives to deviate from collusion, and it decreases piC , decreasing incentives
for collusion; which of the three effects dominate depends upon the levels of
α, v, and n, thus an increase in n can make sustaining collusion either more
or less difficult.
3.3 Comparing Models of Repeated Conflicts with Noise
Our results on the factors affecting the sustainability of collusion with ad-
ditive noise differ markedly from the closely related analysis of Shaffer and
Shogren (2008), who analyze incentives for collusion in an infinitely repeated
contest with the Tullock CSF. When players attempt to sustain collusion
by using Nash reversion strategies, Shaffer and Shogren (2008) show that a
decrease in γ (i.e., an increase in the level of noise in the contest) makes
sustaining collusion more difficult by making the Nash reversion punishment
less severe.11 Shaffer and Shogren (2008) also show that an increase in the
contest’s prize value does not affect the sustainability of collusion and that
an increase in contest’s number of players makes sustaining collusion more
difficult. Broadly speaking, our results differ from one another because of
the nature of players’ deviations from collusion.
In the case of the Tullock CSF, as in Shaffer and Shogren (2008), each
player’s optimal deviation from collusion involves making an infinitesimally
small expenditure and winning the contest with probability 1 because the
Tullock CSF lacks noise in this case. This means piD ≈ v, piC = vn as
before, and piN =
n−γ(n−1)
n2
v is the well-known Nash equilibrium for the one-
11Shaffer and Shogren (2008) analyze the critical discount rate (r∗) sustaining collusion,
which relates to the critical discount factor (δ∗) we analyze as δ∗ = 1/(1 + r∗).
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shot Tullock contest. Importantly, then, the only payoff affected by noise is
the Nash equilibrium payoff, the punishment for defection, which increases
as noise increases (i.e., as γ decreases). More noise therefore makes the
punishment for deviating less severe, making collusion more difficult. The
collusive, deviation, and Nash equilibrium payoffs are all proportional to v, so
it drops out of the threshold δ∗ completely and has no impact on collusion,
and the dominant impact of an increase in n is to decrease the collusive
payoff, making collusion harder to sustain. Specifically, for the Tullock CSF
we can calculate the threshold
δ∗ =
n2 − n
n2 − n+ γ(n− 1) ,
which is much simpler than the δ∗ in the case of additive noise presented in
the previous subsection.
By contrast, the additive noise CSF always has noise, whether players
make expenditures or not, and thus each player’s optimal deviation from
collusion is more complex. Simply making some positive expenditure when
all other players make 0 expenditures does not guarantee that a player wins
the contest with probability 1. The more complicated nature of the optimal
deviation, and in turn piD, is then what leads to the different results for
the additive noise model when it comes to sustaining collusion, since piD is
nonlinear in all three of the parameters of interest. The collusive payoffs are
the same in both cases, and the Nash equilibrium payoffs are qualitatively
very similar, both increasing in noise and decreasing in n. The fact that
more noise, a larger prize, and more players have such different impacts on
the ability to sustain collusion in a repeated conflict with additive noise, as
compared to exponential noise, is therefore due to the payoff to defection,
and how those factors impact that payoff in each case.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop and study models of one-shot and repeated con-
flicts whose outcomes are to some extent determined by noise. In one-shot
conflicts where players have the possibility of forming alliances, exponential
noise in the Tullock CSF can make alliance formation profitable to allies and
overcome the alliance puzzle while additive noise in the CSF from Amegashie
(2006a) cannot. In repeated conflicts with additive noise and the possibility
of collusion, we show that sustaining collusion is easier the more noise there
is and more difficult the larger the contest’s prize value, while an increase in
the contest’s number of players can make sustaining collusion either more or
less difficult, all in marked contrast to the exponential noise case analyzed
by Shaffer and Shogren (2008). Though we make no claim as to which form
of noise in conflicts is more realistic, our results clearly demonstrate that the
form of noise present in a conflict has important implications both for the
possibility of forming cooperative relationships as well as for the features of
such relationships.
Thinking in terms of what our results mean for conflict situations, it
seems reasonable that the degree of randomness present in any situation
may prevent players’ expenditures from impacting their probability of victory
precisely. In addition to having the effect of lowering individual spending in
a standard contest, we have shown that the presence of such imperfections
can actually make alliances between warring parties worthwhile, since the
imprecision makes their spending less substitutable, and thus more valuable
to one another. Having more precise control over events would actually make
it more difficult for the parties to trust one another due to stronger free-
riding incentives. This suggests that military alliances might be less common
if the conflict outcomes were made less random through, for example, the
deployment of enhanced military technologies.
Does randomness disappear if players refrain from conflict spending? This
question proves to be important in a repeated setting. If players in a re-
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peated conflict situation have achieved a peaceful arrangement, the incentive
to break the peace is very different if one player can win the prize with cer-
tainty with an arbitrarily small effort, as opposed to a situation in which the
now one-sided conflict’s outcome is to some extent random. If more players
means a larger amount of extant randomness (nα in the denominator of the
additive noise CSF), for example, then a larger number of players actually
makes a collusive outcome easier to sustain. This result, which is fairly un-
usual, is due to the fact that there is more randomness to overcome for any
would-be defector. In conflicts with additive noise, growth in the number of
players in conflict has the effect, among others, of amplifying the amount of
noise determining the conflicts outcome. Since we have demonstrated that
an increase in noise makes sustaining collusion relatively easier, it stands to
reason that an increase in the number of players can in some cases have the
same overall effect.
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